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INTERSECTIONALITY ANDTHE NOTION OF DISABILITY IN EU
DISCRIMINATION LAW
DAGMAR SCHIEK*
Abstract
Defining the characteristics targeted by banning discrimination
constitutes a central challenge for EU discrimination law, and defining
disability is particularly challenging due to the dispute around the very
concept of disability. From 2006, the ECJ has wrestled with this definition
in six judgments, five of which were delivered as of 2013. Instead of
classifying the case law definition as conforming to a medical or social
model of disability, this article analyses the case law with a view to
illustrate challenges of defining discrimination grounds generally,
suggesting that a sufficiently precise and non-exclusive definition of
discrimination grounds can be achieved by re-focusing EU discrimination
law around the nodes of sex, race and disability. The analysis exposes that
the ECJ definition of disability neither complies with the UN CRPD nor
adequately responds to intersectionality theory, for example because the
definition is exclusionary in relation to female experience of disability.
1. Introduction
Fifteen years after the EU first legislated against discrimination on grounds of
disability,1 ECJ case law on the notion of disability has gained some
momentum: moving on from a single case on distinguishing disability from
long-term illness in 2006,2 the Court has delivered no less than six rulings on
the definition of the term disability in EU discrimination law, culminating in
the Kaltoft ruling of December 2014,3 which indicated that dismissal on the
* Professor of Law, Jean Monnet ad personam Chair in EU Law & Policy, Director of
Centre for European and Transnational Legal Studies, Queen’s University Belfast. Thanks are
due to Theresia Degener and Anna Lawson for sharing their partly unpublished work, and to the
anonymous referees whose valuable critique spurred me to clarify and enhance my argument.
The usual disclaimer applies.
1. By Directive 2000/78/EC, establishing a general framework of equal treatment in
employment and occupation, O.J. 2000, L 303/16.
2. Case C-13/05, Sonia Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, EU:C:2006:456.
3. Case C-354/13, Fag og Arbejde (FOA), acting on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft v.
Kommunernes Landsforening (KL), EU:C:2014:2463.
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grounds of extreme obesity might constitute disability discrimination within
this framework.
Disability law experts have already commented on these rulings from the
perspective of EU disability law and policy,4 focusing on the question whether
the Court goes beyond a medical model of disability and embraces the social
model of disability, making reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
However, this series of cases deserves a more fundamental analysis due to
the central relevance of the categories on the basis of which discrimination is
outlawed (discrimination grounds) for the wider field of EU discrimination
law. Their definition not only demarcates the boundaries of discrimination
law, but also harbours the danger of compartmentalizing the field into discrete
sections, such as sex discrimination law, race discrimination law and disability
discrimination law. Such compartmentalization weakens discrimination law,
for example by refusing to award remedies to those at the intersections of
discrimination grounds – one of the points made be socio-legal researchers
who developed intersectionality theory.5 This article argues that
intersectionality theory can and should also inform the central categories of
4. See e.g. Waddington, case note on Case C-13/05 Chacón Navas, 44 CML Rev. (2007),
487–499; id., “HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge) interpreting EU equality law in the
light of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, 17 European
Anti-Discrimination LawReview (2013), 13–22; id., “Saying all the right things and still getting
it wrong: The Court of Justice’s definition of disability in EU”, 22 MJ (2015), 576–591;
McTique, “From Navas to Kaltoft: The European Court of Justice’s evolving definition of
disability and the implications for HIV-positive individuals”, 16 International Journal of
Discrimination and the Law (2015), 1–15; Hosking, “Fat rights claim rebuffed”, 44 Industrial
Law Journal (2015), 460–471; Favalli and Ferri, “Defining disability in EU non-discrimination
legislation: Judicial activism and legislative restraints”, 22 EPL (2016), forthcoming.
5. Kimberlee Crenshaw coined the term intersectionality in the 1980s when critiquing the
neglect of black women’s discrimination by US anti-discrimination law (Crenshaw,
“Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of
antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics”, (1989) University of
Chicago Legal Forum, 107–167). Intersectionality theory has recently been re-phrased as a
socio-legal research agenda by a group of authors including Crenshaw (Cho, Crenshaw and
McCall, “Towards a field of intersectionality studies: Theory, applications and praxis”, 38
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society (2013), 785–810). European intersectionality
studies initially concentrated in sociology and political science (e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davis,
“Contextualizing feminism: Ethnic, gender and class divisions”. 15 Feminist Review (1983),
62–75; Krzsán, Skeje and Squire, Institutionalizing Intersectionality: The Changing Nature of
European Equality Regimes (Macmillan, 2012) and only recently involve legal scholars (see
e.g. Grabham, Cooper et al. (Eds.), Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics
of Location (Routledge, 2009); Schiek and Lawson (Eds.), EU Non-Discrimination Law and
Intersectionality: Investigating the Triangle of Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination
(Ashgate, 2011), specifically on remedies as added value of intersectionality see Schiek,
“Multiple discrimination in EU law: Opportunities for legal responses to intersectional gender
discrimination? (executive report)”, in Burri and Schiek (Eds.), Multiple Discrimination in
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discrimination law: it demands that courts, in defining discrimination
grounds, avoid exclusion across grounds, for example by failing to recognize
the disabling effect of impairments typically suffered by women or ethnic
minorities. The question how discrimination grounds should be defined in
order to avoid such seemingly discriminatory effects of the definition has as
such not yet been the subject of academic debate. Suggestions can be derived
from the reconceptualization of discrimination law through organizing its
categories around the interconnected nodes of sex/gender, race/ethnicity and
disability, which mirror disadvantage resulting from ascribed otherness.6
Disability discrimination law is an ideal field for exploring this further, and
the exploration can also contribute to a more adequate legal definition of
disability.
In order to develop this argument, the next section will outline the relevance
of EU disability discrimination law for defining the categories of EU
discrimination law as a whole, and specify which aspects of the wider field of
disability law and policy are relevant to the discussion. This will be followed
by a summary of the Court’s first and last judgments on the notion of
disability,7 which the Court’s advocates general classify as progressively
adopting a social model of disability. The fourth section develops the
theoretical frame for the case law analysis: it maps the debate around the
medical and social model of disability as sociological concepts, locates its
impact on the CRPD; and specifies the relevance of intersectionality theory
for a suitable definition of disability and other discrimination grounds by
reference to the nodes model mentioned before. The fifth section critically
analyses the six judgments, exposing that the Court does not use either the
social model or the CRPD’s guidelines for defining disability. The analysis
will also expose that neither model of disability is suitable for a legal
definition of a discrimination ground, especially as both tend to exclude
disproportionally disabilities afflicted upon those who are not white middle
class men. The last point is illustrated with examples from the intersection of
gender and disability.The article concludes that much remains to be done so as
to develop an adequate definition of disability for EU discrimination law.
EU law: Opportunities for Legal Responses to Intersectional Gender Discrimination?,
pp. 19–20, see also the examples in the national reports in this study (coordinated by Burri and
Van Eyken).
6. Schiek, “Organising EU equality law around the nodes of ‘race’, gender and disability”,
in Schiek and Lawson, op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 11–27.
7. Cases C-13/05, Chacón Navas and C-354/13, FAO Kaltoft.
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2. The relevance of disability law for the field of discrimination law
As a prism gathers sunlight and reflects it in multiple colours, disability
discrimination law underlines the multiple challenges to be met in defining
the characteristics on the grounds for which discrimination is targeted by law
(discrimination grounds), which are again central to its mission.
Since EU discrimination law emerged from socio-political movements,
initially focused on discrete experiences,8 its application tends to insulate the
experience of discrimination into discrete strands such as sex discrimination
law, race/ethnicity discrimination law and disability discrimination law. The
resulting compartmentalization is criticized because it does not adequately
capture discrimination at the intersection of discrete grounds.9 Beyond this,
compartmentalization also reduces the impact of discrimination law: as a
multifaceted field it is potentially more powerful than the sum of each of its
components. However, the injustices addressed by discrimination law may
seem very discrete and diverse: racist hate crime and the refusal to promote
women to managerial posts may not seem connected at first sight. While the
EU, in combining a competence for outlawing discrimination on grounds of
sex, race, ethnic origin, age, disability, sexual orientation and religion and
belief in one provision (Art. 19 TFEU) has conceptualized EU discrimination
law as one socio-legal field, protagonists do not readily acknowledge an
overarching rationale unifying the discrete experiences. As a result, the
practical application of EU discrimination law still fails in addressing
intersectional discrimination.
Disability discrimination law constitutes a microcosm of this same
problem, due to the wide variety of conditions which may lead to recognizing
a disability. Those conditions range from those easily perceptible in everyday
contact – such as missing limbs, facial deformation or sensual deviations such
as visual or hearing impairments – to other conditions which are not easily
discernible, including illnesses such as heart disease, diabetes, clinical
depression or chronic fatigue syndrome. Such diversity seems ill-suited for
instigating spontaneous solidarity across different disabilities.10 Nevertheless,
8. For an evaluation from political science perspectives see Verloo, “Intersectional and
cross-movement politics and policies: Reflections on current practices and debates”, 38 Signs:
Journal of Women in Culture and Society (2013), 893–915, from a legal studies perspective,
Schiek, “EU non-discrimination law & policy: Gender in the maze of multidimensional
equalities”, in Hohmann-Dennhardt, Koerner and Zimmer (Eds.), Geschlechtergerechtigkeit,
(Nomos, 2010), pp. 472–488.
9. More detail infra in section 4.2.
10. Hendricks, “The UN Disability Convention and (multiple) discrimination: Should EU
non-discrimination law be modelled accordingly?”, 2 European Yearbook of Disability Law
(2010), 21.
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defining disability as a discrimination ground has the potential of combining
these disparate experiences into a socio-legal field of its own. The disability
rights movement11 at national and European levels seems to have achieved just
that, by establishing a common cause for those very diverse experiences by
shifting focus. Traditionally, disability had been perceived as a deficit of the
person, which possibly can be cured, and as long as it is not cured requires
compensation. The focus on the individual person who deviated from
normalcy implied countless specific responses, frequently associated with
paternalism and de-recognition.12 By contrast, the disability rights movement
focused on the reaction of society to the (alleged) deviance from normalcy,
partly going as far as viewing disability as merely a “social construct”.13
Unifying all the different individuals under a social construct notion of
disability also defined an overarching aim for the ban of disability
discrimination, claiming a common cause for overcoming disadvantage based
on a wide variety of conditions. Such success surely holds lessons for
discrimination law at large.
Accordingly, this article is not dedicated to EU disability law and policy as
a whole,14 which overlaps with, but is both wider and narrower than EU
discrimination law and policy. On a pragmatic definition, EU discrimination
law comprises a body of secondary EU law aiming at securing equal treatment
irrespective of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion and belief, disability, age,
and sexual orientation.15 While these directives are predominantly based on
11. The term “Disability Rights Movement” best captures the focus of the national and
European level activist groupings engaging for the inclusion of disabled persons into society
(Vanhala, Making Rights a Reality? Disability Rights Activists and Legal Mobilisation (CUP,
2011); Kemple, Ahmad and Girijashanker, “Shaping disability rights through shaping the
disability movement”, 3 Journal of Human Rights Practice (2011), 355–363). Nevertheless, the
European umbrella organization is known by the name “European Disability Forum” (Mabbet,
“The development of rights-based social policy in the European Union: The example of
disability rights”, 43 JCMS (2005), 97–120).
12. See for this development Degener, “Disabled people, non-discrimination of ”, in
Wolfrum (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (OUP, 2013).
13. This term even made it into the 2003 Commission Action plan on equal opportunities
for people with disabilities COM(2003)650 final, page 6, see Lawson, “The EU rights based
approach to disability: Strategies for shaping an inclusive society”, 6 International Journal for
Discrimination and the Law (2006), 269–287. For a critical assessment of “social construct
phase” see Quinn and Flynn, “Transatlantic borrowings: The past and future of EU
non-discrimination law and policy on the ground of disability”, 60 American Journal of
Criminal Law (2012), 28–31.
14. A regular update on EU disability law and policy is published in part 2 of the European
Yearbook of Disability Law (5th edition 2015, edited by Quinn and Waddington).
15. The main directives are Council Directive 2000/78/EC (cited supra note 1); Council
Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin O.J. 2000, L 180/22; Council Directive 2004/113
implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and
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what is today Article 19 TFEU,16 primary law provides normative
underpinnings in Articles 8, 10 and 157 TFEU and Articles 21–26 Charter of
Fundamental Rights (hereafter: CFREU).
The EU discrimination directives are quite explicit (and as such limiting) on
the notion of discrimination:17 they demand that Member States enact
legislation banning discrimination on all the six “discrimination grounds” in
the fields of employment. Race and sex discrimination also need to be
addressed beyond employment to various degrees, for example in relation to
social security, education, health, and access to and provision with goods and
services. Banning discrimination requires providing effective remedies
beyond criminal prosecution against direct discrimination, indirect
discrimination, harassment and instruction to discriminate. Only for disability
discrimination, the refusal to provide reasonable accommodation of
difference also constitutes discrimination.18
However, the directives are silent (and thus less limiting) on another central
element of the field: the definition of the characteristics for which
discrimination is targeted by law (discrimination grounds) is specified neither
at EU level nor in most national laws.19 Since this field is left to judicial
interpretation, the first six judgments of the European Court of Justice on
disability hold lessons for the definition of discrimination grounds at large, as
supply of goods and services, O.J. 2004, L 373/37; as well as Directive 2006/54/EC of the
Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and
equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) O.J.
2006, L 204/23, 2006/54 and Council Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of
the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security O.J. 1979, L
6/24. While at times a narrower notion of EU discrimination law is used, comprising Directives
2000/43 and 2000/78 only, because those directives marked a new era (e.g. Bell, “The principle
of equal treatment: Widening and deepening”, in Craig and De Búrca (Eds.), The Evolution of
EU Law (OUP, 2011), p. 623), most academic writers perceive EU anti-discrimination law as
encompassing sex discrimination (see for more references Schiek, op. cit. supra note 8 at pp.
472–481).
16. The directives targeting sex discrimination in employment are based on what is today
Art. 153 TFEU. The reasons for this split in competence deserve their own critique, which lies
beyond the scope of this article.
17. On the notion of discrimination in EU law see the relevant chapters in Ellis and Watson,
EU Anti-Discrimination Law, 2nd Ed. (OUP, 2012). Hepple, Equality – The New Framework,
2nd Ed. (Hart, 2014). See also Schiek, “Elements of a new framework for the principle of equal
treatment of persons in EC law: Directives 2000/43/EC, 2000/78/EC and 2002/73/EC changing
Directive 76/207/EEC in context”, 8 ELJ (2002), 137–157.
18. The exclusion of discrimination grounds such as sex, age, and religion, from this
concept has been criticized, alongside the limited potential of reasonable accommodation to
promote structural change (Schiek, “Broadening the scope and the norms of EU gender equality
law: Towards a multidimensional conception of equality law”, 12MJ (2005), 463–464).
19. The two common law jurisdictions, and notably UK law, have partly been an exception
to this rule, see Quinn and Flynn, op. cit. supra note 13, 40–41.
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well as the opportunity to establish new directions for the interrelation of
intersectionality and law.
3. The Court’s route from Chacón Navas to Kaltoft –A first
impression
The Court’s first and the last rulings on the notion of disability illustrate well
the development of the case law under analysis: the latest case FOA
(Kaltoft),20 concerning obesity, partly confirms the very first one, Chacón
Navas,21 concerning long-term illness. Although this may indicate that the
Court moves in circles, its advocates general present these cases as start and
end-point of a move towards accepting a social model of disability.
TheChacón Navas case dates back to 2006, and concerned the dismissal of
a female employee by a catering provider on grounds of long periods of
absence on grounds of illness. While this dismissal was unlawful under
Spanish labour law, the only remedy available was a compensation. Had the
dismissal been discriminatory, the remedy would have been reinstatement.
This inspired the Madrid labour court to refer the case to the Court of Justice,
with two main questions. First the national court enquired whether EU law
must be interpreted as including a ban on discrimination on grounds of long
term illness, and in the second instance it wished to know whether the notion
of disability in Directive 2000/78/EC encompasses long term illness.
The Court of Justice answered the first question in the negative on the
rationale that today’s Article 19 TFEU does not, in itself, prohibit
discrimination, but rather provides an EU competence to legislate against
discrimination. This competence again is limited to banning discrimination on
a finite number of grounds, and neither the competence nor the legislation
based on it can be expanded by interpretation.22
In its second question on the notion of disability, the referring court cited
the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Functioning,
Disability and Health (ICF), which stresses the fluid boundaries between
health, sickness and disability. This indicated the national judges’ hope of
achieving a broad notion of disability under EU law, which might encompass
long-term illness in certain circumstances. The Court of Justice was not
inspired to follow these suggestions. While it grasped the opportunity to claim
the notion of disability under Directive 2000/78/EC as an autonomous
20. Case C-354/13, FAO Kaltoft.
21. Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas.
22. Paras. 55–56.
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concept under EU law,23 it also delivered a relatively narrow definition,
stating that the “concept of ‘disability’ must be understood as referring to a
limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological
impairments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in
professional life”.24
From this narrow notion of disability the Court concluded that disability
must be distinguished from sickness,25 in particular through its long
duration.26 This chimed with Advocate General Geelhoed’s concern that a
finding of disability discrimination will “always entail a substantive claim to
equal access to or continued employment” with “potentially far-reaching
consequences, economic and financial”,27 which in his view warranted a
“precise definition” of disability, while the principal competence of the
Member States for social policy mitigated against “widening the scope of
Article 13 EC [now: Art. 19 TFEU] by relying on the general policy of
equality”.28 While the Advocate General acknowledged that disability was an
“indeterminate concept”,29 “undergoing a fairly rapid evolution”,30 he
proposed the narrow definition accepted by the Court.31
The FOA Kaltoft ruling32 related to the dismissal of a childminder
employed by a Danish municipality, who had been classed as obese in line
with the WHO ICD from 1998. After his return from a period of
family-related leave in March 2010, Mr Kaltoft’s limited success in losing
weight through employer-supported fitness training was discussed in several
unannounced meetings with the organization’s director. When demand for
municipal child-care decreased, Mr Kaltoft was selected for dismissal. His
obesity had been mentioned in the relevant consultation meeting, though the
employer contested that the dismissal was based on obesity.
The national court mainly wished to explore whether EU law, due to
Articles 21–26 CFREU now being legally binding, contains a general
prohibition of obesity discrimination or a general ban of discrimination in
employment. The question whether obesity can be classified as disability
under Directive 2000/7833 was only their secondary concern. The Court
referred to and confirmed the principles developed in Chacón Navas: the list
23. Paras. 40–42.
24. Para 43.
25. Para 44.
26. Para 45.
27. Para 50 of the Opinion in Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas, EU:C:2006:84.
28. Ibid., paras. 53–54.
29. Ibid., para 57.
30. Ibid., para 58.
31. Ibid., paras. 76–77.
32. Case C-354/13, FAO Kaltoft.
33. Directive 2000/78/EC, cited supra note 1.
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of grounds on which discrimination is banned by Directive 2000/78/EC
cannot be expanded by way of interpretation, and there is no general ban on
weight discrimination to be derived from the CFREU.34 The Court only made
very scant reference to the CFREU, omitting to mention any specific
Article.35 Advocate General Jäskinnen’s Opinion explains this omission.
While the list of discrimination grounds in Article 21 CFREU is open-ended,
and might thus include obesity, the CFREU must not expand the EU’s
competences.36 The Advocate General thus returned to the concern raised by
Advocate General Geelhoed in Chacón Navas: Member States’ prerogatives
in social policy matters are to be safeguarded. The CFREU principles would
only bind a Member State if its legislation falls within the substantive scope of
EU legislation or directly effective Treaty law: a legislative competence such
asArticle 19 TFEU is not sufficient to achieve this.37 In so far, the case law has
come full circle.
However, as regards the notion of disability, the Court quoted the definition
of disability developed by its Grand Chamber earlier
“Following the ratification by the European Union of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which was approved on
behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26
November 2009 (O.J. 2010, L 23/35), the Court held the concept of ‘disability’
must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular from
long-term physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction
with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the
person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers.”38
The Court thus stressed that it now adheres to the notion of disability
promoted by the CRPD, while Advocate General Jääskinen suggested that the
Court had moved towards the social model of disability.39 It is open to doubt,
however, whether the argumentation of the Court and its advocates general in
the younger case law on disability complies with the social model of
34. The Court cited para 56 of the Chacón Navas ruling, as well as para 46 of Coleman,
which is mainly relevant for acknowledging discrimination by association (Case C-303/06, S.
Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, EU:C:2008:415).
35. Case C-354/13, FAO Kaltoft, para 39.
36. Para 19 of the Opinion in Case C-354/13,FAO Kaltoft, EU:C:2014:2106, with reference
to Cases C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, para 23 and C-370/12, Pringle,
EU:C:2012:756, para 179.
37. Paras. 22 and 23 of the Opinion in Case C-354/13, FAO Kaltoft.
38. Case C-354/13,FAO Kaltoft, para 53, with reference to Joined Cases C-335-337/11,HK
Danmark, EU:C:2013:222, paras. 37–39, Case C-363/12, Z. v. A Government department and
The Board of management of a community school, EU:C:2014:159, para 76 and Case C-356/12,
Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern, EU:C:2014:350, para 45.
39. Para 41 of his Opinion.
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disability.40 In addition, the point can be made that the dichotomy between a
medical and a social model of disability is not a sufficient starting point to
develop the notion of disability for the purposes of EU discrimination law,
especially if addressing intersectional inequalities.
Before we can analyse the case law in detail in the light of these
considerations, it is necessary to summarize the discussion on the notion of
disability initiated by the disability rights movement and its relation to the
CRPD, as well as developing a theoretical frame for legal definitions of
discrimination grounds in the light of intersectionality theory.
4. Notions of disability and intersectional inequality: Theoretical
frame
4.1. Medical and social models of disability and the UN CRPD
As already indicated, the terms “medical” and “social model of disability”
have been developed in the disability rights movement. The underlying
socio-political discourse perceives the move from the medical to the social
model of disability as progressive, which seems to indicate that there is no
space for the medical model in applying EU discrimination law.
The medical model appears as a “parody”41 at times: by defining disability
mainly with reference to an impairment attached to a person, the medical
model allegedly suggests that such limitations for persons with disabilities can
and should be overcome by medical cures or treatment and, if this fails, by
physical or technological processes addressing the impairment. Such
processes aim at reinstating a state of normalcy, idealizing a world in which
human beings do not differ too much: disability is defined as deviation from
the average state of health.42
Those categorizations originate not from discrimination law, but rather
from specific legislation creating entitlements for disabled persons, for
example special benefits replacing or supplementing income from
employment, or claims to specific services allowing participation.43 This
purpose corresponds to a metric approach to defining disability, since
different degrees of disability lead to different levels of entitlement. These
40. This is also supported by the case notes referenced in note 4 supra.
41. See Quinn and Flynn, op. cit. supra note 13, 28.
42. Geist, Petermann and Widhammer, “Disability law in Germany”, 24 Comparative
Labor Law & Policy Journal (2003), 563 et seq.
43. See Degener, op. cit. supra note 12, No. 2 and 6; see also Mabbet, “Some are more equal
than others: Definitions of disability in social policy and discrimination law in Europe”, 34
Journal of Social Policy (2002), 215–233.
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differentiations constitute contestable political choices: it would be entirely
possible to grant assistance or benefits in relation to individual need without
requiring a medical statement related to a degree of disability.44 The
distinction between disability benefits and “normal” unemployment benefits,
for example, can be traced back to more favourable treatment of war veterans
who had impairments related, for example, to the loss of limbs, as compared
with other unemployed persons.45 Modern welfare States have overcome the
underlying causal approach to disability, according to which those who
suffered impairment while engaged in a good cause are most deserving,
followed by those suffering impairment without contributing (e.g. by being
born with an impairment or involvement in an accident), and last by those
who somehow contributed to their impairment. Nevertheless, the
medicalization of deviance has remained decisive for classifying persons as
disabled.
This classification is criticized as a social construct, based on interaction of
law and medicine,46 and perceived as a starting point for discrimination and
exclusion of those labelled as belonging to the category of disabled persons.
The social model of disability was developed with the aim of politically
challenging such discrimination and exclusion.47 Its proponents suggested
that disability results from society’s reaction to impairments, and not the
impairments as such. In its most radical form, the social model was originally
developed by the British Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation
(UPIAS).48 Their refined policy statement established in 1975 relied on the
slogan that “it is society which disables physically impaired people”. The core
idea is the distinction between impairment and disability. Disability refers to
the restriction of activity participation. It results from the lack of taking into
account physical impairments, but not from the physical impairments as such.
Parallels have been drawn to the feminist distinction between sex, which has a
biological base, and gender, which is an ascription of roles to women.49
Since the 1970s, the debates on sociological models of disability have been
refined. In particular, the UPIAS definition has been criticized for neglecting
44. Ibid., 222–224.
45. Welti, Behinderung und Rehabilitation (Mohr Siebeck, 2005), pp. 25–46.
46. See Quinn, Degener and Bruce, Human Rights and Disability: The Current Use and
Future Potential of UN Human Rights Instruments in the Context of Disability (UN
Publications, 2002), p. 10.
47. See for a recent defence, Barnes, “The social model of disability: Valuable or
irrelevant?”, in Watson et al (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Disability Studies (Routledge,
2012), pp. 12–29.
48. Shakespeare, “The social model of disability”, in Davis (Ed.), Disability Studies
Reader, 4th ed. (Routledge, 2013), pp. 214–221.
49. Garland-Thomson, “Integrating disability, transforming feminist theory”, in Davis,
ibid., pp. 333–346.
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the impact of impairment on the life-experience of disabled people,50 as well
as for rejecting any positive role of medical cures or treatment for the life
experience of people with impairments.Treating or curing impairments in line
with a true medical mission, which is not driven by the paternalistic urge to
normalize, can be beneficial to someone suffering from ill health.51 Any
model of disability that neglects impairment will downplay the experience of
chronic illness, especially if involving high levels of pain, or of conditions
such as depression, arthritis, chronic fatigue syndrome (ME) or diabetes.
These only fit the “barrier” model of disability with difficulty: prejudices
aside, there is no single barrier (such as a staircase) the removal of which will
alleviate suffering from those long-term conditions. Accommodating these
conditions into models of disability requires acknowledging suffering, for
which there is limited room in the social model of disability.
While the social model of disability has been critiqued, medical approaches
to disability have also changed, as mirrored in the International Classification
of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF), approved by the 54th WHO
assembly in 2001. The ICF aims at “measuring health and disability at both
individual and population level”. It is thus firmly based on a metric notion of
disability. However, it acknowledges that every human being may experience
illness and disability throughout his or her life course. It is also claimed that
“ICF takes into account the social aspects of disability and does not see
disability only as a ‘medical’ or ‘biological’ dysfunction. By including
Contextual Factors, in which environmental factors are listed ICF allows to
records the impact of the environment on the person’s functioning”.52
If disability is an aspect of life insofar as very few people command all
abilities a human being can have, strategies in disability policy can focus on
adapting the environment to a wider spectrum of abilities, and abandoning
expectations of “normality”.53 The ubiquity of disability under this notion
also potentially increases the attractiveness of disability as a subject of funded
research:54 like age,55 disability is perceived as a condition that is likely to
affect everyone in due course. Accordingly, one might expect a coalition of
powerful white men to support research in, and juridical responses to
50. Shakespeare, op. cit. supra note 48.
51. Similarly Quinn and Flynn, op. cit. supra note 13, 28–29.
52. See <www.who.int/classifications/icf/en> (visited 6 July 2015).
53. Fredman, Discrimination Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2011), p. 96 with further references.
54. E.g.,Alexander Somek’s scalding critique of EU anti-discrimination law, which ignores
most of the literature on the subject, and only perceives disability discrimination law with its
fluid categories and the concept of reasonable accommodation as worthy of being maintained
(An Essay on EU Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP, 2013)).
55. Schiek, “Age discrimination before the ECJ – Conceptual and theoretical issues”, 48
CML Rev. (2011), 777–799.
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disabilities, because disability of some kind is likely to be experienced by
themselves and their peers. If this is the case, care must be taken to not
prioritize the disabilities of some people rather than others through the way in
which disability is defined.
Overall, the path from the medical to the social model of disability is not a
clear route to progress. Degener even suggested that the social model does not,
in itself, “give any guidance as how to alternatively legally define disability”56
because it lacks a clear distinction between characteristic and treatment.57
Perju argued that this lack of precision leads judges to revert to the medically
inspired categorizations.58
A human59 or civil60 rights model has been promoted as moving beyond
both the medical and the social model of disability. The UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), as a legal instrument, constitutes
an attempt to address such criticism.61 It refrains from blending out
impairment, while acknowledging the social conditioning which, in
interaction with impairment, creates disability, and demands a structural
instead of an individual response. As a consequence of concerns about
defining disability, the CRPD does not provide a comprehensive definition,
leaving scope for future development.62 Its first article states: “Persons with
disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or
sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder
their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.”
This open definition acknowledges the role of impairment as well as the
relevance of socio-economic barriers hindering full participation. However, it
does not fully incorporate the social model of disability, as suggested by the
reference to “persons with disabilities” in its title. By contrast, adepts of the
social model of disability prefer speaking of “disabled persons” instead of
“persons with disabilities”.63 Since the UN Convention not only bans
discrimination, but also provides for socio-economic rights for persons with
56. Degener, “The definition of disability in German and foreign discrimination law”,
(2006) Disability Studies Quarterly, 26, under (2)(a).
57. Ibid.
58. Perju, “Impairment, discrimination and legal construction of disability in the European
Union and the United States”, 44 Cornell International Law Journal (2011), 331 and 341–345.
59. See on this Degener, op. cit. supra note 11 and Quinn, Degener and Bruce, op. cit. supra
note 46.
60. Quinn and Flynn, op. cit. supra note 13.
61. See also Kayess and French, “Out of darkness into light? Introducing the Convention on
the rights of persons with disabilities”, 8 Human Rights Law Review (2008), 22–24.
62. Ibid.
63. See Lawson and Priestley, “Potential, principle and pragmatism in concurrent
multinational monitoring: Disability rights in the European Union”, (2013) The International
Journal of Human Rights, 739. See Morris, “Impairment and disability: Constructing an ethics
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disability, the notion of disability may well differ in discrimination law
inspired by the Convention on the one hand and laws creating entitlements to
subsidies on the other. Article 2 defines disability discrimination as exclusion
and deprivation related to disability – thus refraining from specifying a
definition for the purposes of discrimination law. Relying on Article 1, the
definition of disability in discrimination law may take impairment as a
starting point.64 Its exact shape is left to implementing legislation – and as we
have seen, EU legislation does not provide such a definition.All we can derive
from the legal instruments which emanated from decades of debate on the
notion of disability is that there is scope for taking impairment as a starting
point, though disability in the sense of depriving persons from participation in
society only emerges from the interaction of impairment with social factors.
4.2. Defining disability without reinforcing discrimination:
Intersectionality and the definition of grounds
A definition of disability for the purposes of discrimination law must
certainly not be discriminatory in itself. This leads to another dimension of
critique of the social model.
The remaining advocates of a “pure” social model tend to highlight certain
categories of disability, in particular the visible lack of a limb or part thereof,
or certain sensual capacities, such as vision or speech.65 Such perspective has
been criticized as being based on a limited ideal person, namely a virtuous
individual, mainly a young male wheelchair user, who is otherwise “fit and
never ill”,66 while the majority of wheelchair users are women over 60
suffering from long-term illness which does not totally exclude the use of
stairs.67 Also, the majority of people affected by chronic illness with high
levels of pain, or by conditions such as depression, arthritis, chronic fatigue
of care that promotes human rights”, 16 Hypatia, (2011), 9; Kaper, Feminist, Queer, Crip
(Indiana University Press, 2013).
64. Degener, Definition of Disability (2004). Study produced under the European
Community action programme to combat discrimination (2001–2006) available at
<www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-ath/gdem/04/disabdef.pdf>; Wells, “The impact of
the Framework Employment Directive on UK disability discrimination law”, 32 ILJ (2003),
261–262.
65. This may be illustrated by publications by US disability activists who define the
impairment that leads to disability as “lacking part or all of limb, organ or mechanism of the
body”, Loewen and Pollard, “The social justice perspective”, 23 Journal of Postsecondary
Education and Disability (2010), 10.
66. See Morris, op. cit. supra note 63, 9, and Crow, “Including all of our lives: Renewing the
social model of disability”, in Barnes and Mercer (Eds.), Exploring the Divide (The Disability
Press, 1996), 58 (using the term “SuperCrip”).
67. Crow, ibid.
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syndrome (ME) or diabetes are women,68 indicating a gender bias of the social
model of disability: it blends out real-life experiences of women more
frequently than those of men.69 Acknowledging the role of impairment in
defining disability may thus reduce sexist elements of the notion of disability.
This indicates the relevance of intersectionality theory for the definition of
disability.
Intersectionality as a term was initially coined by Kimberlee Crenshaw in
order to challenge how US American discrimination law de-recognized
disadvantage experienced specifically by black women. Following her own
terms, Crenshaw aimed to create a meso-level theory which would inform
action research.70 Her initial focus was on adequate remedies for
discrimination at the intersection of grounds. Intersectionality theory has been
taken up by sociologists and political scientists as an instrument in analysing
categories of disadvantage in society. The resulting complex theory has been
criticized as being of little relevance to law.71 Indeed, since law is a blunt
sword, discrimination law depends on a finite number of categories in order
not to be overly diluted.72 Clearly this poses dilemmas for defining
discrimination grounds, in particular if discrimination law addresses
socio-economic reality and not just State and other public action. As has
become apparent from the short summary of the first and most recent ECJ
cases on the notion of disability, defining discrimination grounds also
specifies the scope of discrimination law and the intensity of its intervention.
Thus, principles such as the rule of law instigate precision of this definition, as
well as a focus on differences that make a difference.
The point made by the intersectionality discourse highlights two dilemmas
in principle.73 First, while each of the discrimination grounds acknowledged
as relevant in law is based on a specific social experience of disadvantage,
each person is characterized by each of the discrimination grounds: either they
suffer discrimination (for example because they are classified as disabled, as
female or as “racialized other”), or they profit from discrimination (for
example because they are classified as healthy, male or white). Second,
discrimination law, in banning ground-specific discrimination may rest on
different rationales, which may even clash: for example, the protection against
68. Wendell, “Unhealthy disabled: Treating chronical illnesses as disabilities”, in Davis, op.
cit. supra note 48, pp. 161–176.
69. Crow, op. cit. supra note 66, 68, Morris, op. cit. supra note 66, 9–10.
70. See Crenshaw; and Cho, Crenshaw and McCall, op. cit. supra note 5.
71. See e.g. Conaghan, “Intersectionality and the feminist project in law”, in Grabham et al.
(Eds.), op. cit. supra note 6, 21–48.
72. For more detail see Schiek, op. cit. supra note 6.
73. The following paragraph constitutes a very short summary of Schiek, “Towards a
multidimensional conception”, op. cit. supra note 18, pp. 441–453.
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ethnic and religious discrimination may rest on a rationale that pursues the
preservation of closed communities engaging in practices that marginalize
women or those choosing a lifestyle non-compliant with heteronormativity.
This creates a complex matrix in two respects. First, due to the asymmetric
character of discrimination, persons may suffer from discrimination and at the
same time profit from it. For example, a man with a mobility impairment may,
due to being male (and perceived as such), be able to command free services
of female relatives helping not only to accommodate this impairment but also
by performing his housework. While that person may be protected by
disability discrimination law, the person serving him unpaid or underpaid may
need protection by sex discrimination law. Second, if rationales for protecting
against discrimination on different grounds clash, equal protection against
discrimination of all these grounds seems elusive. Instead, discrimination
regimes frequently create a hierarchy of equalities, which again do not provide
adequate protection for those on the intersection of grounds.
These dilemmas call for an integrated approach to discrimination law.74
Such an integrated approach presupposes a common rationale for the whole
field of discrimination law, and all the discrimination grounds to be addressed
by the field. Achieving this requires both an abstraction from ground-specific
rationales and a refocusing of discrimination law around a finite number of
dimensions.
The common rationale for banning discrimination on all grounds consists
of overcoming disadvantage derived from ascribed otherness. Ascribing
otherness is a social process through which persons are categorized by others.
Such categorization through heteronomous acts challenges self-determination
and autonomy.
Being excluded from full participation in economic, social or political life
on the basis of a heteronomous ascription sums up the harm inflicted by
discrimination. Since ascription is a heteronomous act, for the purposes of
discrimination law it does not matter whether a person carries a certain
characteristic. Accordingly, in order to show discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation, the affected person does not have to show that he is actually
homosexual, as long as he is perceived as homosexual. Similarly, in order to
show disability discrimination, it is sufficient that the affected person
demonstrates that she is perceived as disabled. This makes any metric
approach to disability not only unnecessary, but fundamentally wrong for the
purposes of discrimination law.
In addressing the harm of discrimination by ascription, discrimination law
must respond to two underlying rationales at the same time: enabling
individuation and respecting difference.
74. Ibid., pp. 460–464.
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Individuation demands that persons are allowed to move outside the box
created by expectations based on ascribed otherness. Discrimination law in
this dimension combats stereotyping, for example by ensuring that women
can move beyond a restricted set of roles frequently circumscribed by the
terms mother and sex-worker, that persons ascribed an inferior status on the
basis of alleged race or ethnicity can act as fully accepted members of any
community and that persons perceived as disabled must not be subjected to
restricting expectations. Individuation, beyond stereotyping, frequently also
entails the right to change one’s identity – to forswear a religion or an alleged
race, or to undergo medical treatment in order to overcome an impairment if
that is possible.
Respecting difference, on the one hand, demands protecting strands of
identity a person does not wish to and should not be expected to give up.
Further, respecting difference requires guaranteeing equality in practice in
spite of durable differences. Examples for these include the ability to become
pregnant, or the different abilities of those considered disabled, as well as
decline through the process of ageing. Lack of opportunities to participate
partly results from the normativity of certain abilities being ingrained in the
design of buildings, communication and transport. However, the durable
differences mentioned above are hard disparities: for example someone may
not be able to see, or become slower in their reactions with age, or be more
predisposed to suffer damage from alcohol consumption. Beyond the need to
surpass formal notions of equality, discrimination grounds such as sex,
disability and age require that the law accepts the need to accommodate
difference. The CRPD accepts this by defining the refusal to accommodate
difference as a form of discrimination.75
Refocusing discrimination law in such a way that potential intersections
between grounds are recognized can be achieved by organizing EU
discrimination law around the three nodes of sex/gender, race/ethnicity and
disability/impairment.76 The concept proposes to re-organize EU
discrimination law as a socio-legal field around these three nodes. The notion
of the socio-legal field alludes to Bourdieu’s notion of a champ social77
comprising a social space established by social interaction on the basis of
75. Art. 2 CRPD; Degener, op. cit. supra note 12, marginal number 3.
76. Schiek, op. cit. supra note 6.
77. A short definition of the concept reads “A field is a structured social space, a field of
forces, a force field. It contains people, who dominate and people who are dominated. Constant
permanent relationships of inequality operate inside this space, which at the same time becomes
a space in which various actors struggle for the transformation or the preservation of the field”
(Bourdieu, On Television. Translated by Parkhurst Ferguson. (New Press, 1998), pp. 40–41).
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power struggles.78 For the context of EU law, the socio-legal field needs to
embrace interrelations between different levels of socio-economic
governance as well as the shaping of interaction through authoritative legal
texts.79 In short the field comprises legal texts, including case law, as well as
institutional actors and socio-economic and cultural actors engaging in the
field of discrimination law and policy.
The three nodes comprise centres and orbs, allowing the attribution of
discrimination grounds such as sexual orientation and transsexuality to the
gender/sex nodes; religious minority, language and culture to the
race/ethnicity node; and age, pregnancy and long-term illness to the disability
node.
The nodes concept also provides orientation for developing notions for
individual discrimination grounds in ways that are feasible for adjudication
and avoid the reinforcement of intersectional inequalities within individual
categories. The disability node is related to the notion of bodily and mental
autonomy and access to social interaction as well as other resources.
Disability discrimination emerges from defining average abilities as a
standard for normality, 80 as well as from society’s desire to avoid the
78. Fligstein, Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe (OUP,
2008), p. 8.
79. Nash, The Cultural Politics of Human Rights – Comparing the US and the UK (CUP,
2009), pp. 30–34.
80. Davis, “Introduction: Normality, power and culture”, in Davis, op. cit. supra note 48, pp.
1–19, makes this point, while attempting to highlight similarities with gender and racism
studies – though reinforcing gendered stereotypes (of each woman becoming a mother) on p. 1.
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perception of suffering. The combination of avoidance and standardization
leads to exclusion on different bases: there is stereotyping as well as the
reluctance to accommodate different abilities.
Standardizing assumed normality results in partly socially constructed
disability. However, social construction is no less decisive for other
discrimination grounds. Race may be even more a social construct than
disability: there is no scientific justification for dividing humankind into
different races. Similar to disability, gender can be seen as a social construct
based on physical difference. Within the reference frame of heteronormativity,
normalization is also a decisive barrier to gender equality. Limiting
opportunity by standardizing assumed normality is thus a common issue
across all three nodes.
As the few examples specified initially highlight, the purposes of
discrimination law would be ill served if, for example, disability were defined
in such a way that impairments frequently suffered by women were not
addressed by disability discrimination law. The principle that discrimination
grounds cannot be defined in a discriminatory way also applies to the other
grounds, and warrants other dimensions within disability. The concept of
interrelated nodes illustrates this normative demand as well: if all the nodes
overlap, limiting protection within any one category to those not suffering
from other discrimination would leave an incomplete picture. Accordingly,
the definition of any individual discrimination ground must be such as to
maximize protection from discrimination for those suffering disadvantage on
other grounds. Thus, the definition of disability must encompass disabilities
resulting from the interaction of impairment with other forms of
discrimination.
4.3. Summary: Two challenges for defining disability
This section has demonstrated that, in defining disability the Court had to
address two formidable and interlinked challenges. First, it needed to move
beyond a purely medical approach measuring disability in metric terms, while
not sacrificing precision. Secondly, it had to define disability in such a way
that impairments related to gender inequality or the exclusion of those
classified as ethnic or racial minority are not disproportionally excluded from
the field.The next section will consider how the six cases decided by the Court
deal with these challenges.
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5. Analysing the Court’s case law against this back ground
5.1. The Court’s case law between models of disability
Do all these cases constitute a steady progression from a medical towards a
social model of disability?
In the 2006 Chacon Navas case,81 the Court’s definition of disability in
relation to discrimination law started out from the medical model. However,
even in this initial ruling, the Court stated that disability in particular – but not
necessarily exclusively – results from an impairment limiting the individual
capabilities. It thus left scope for acknowledging other causes for the
limitation constituting disability. Similarly, Advocate General Geelhoed,
though concluding that “disabled people are people with serious limitations
due to physical, psychological or mental afflictions”,82 also perceived of a role
for the social environment of disabled people insofar as a disability which is
not perceived in the social environment will hardly lead to discrimination.83
Nevertheless, neither the Court nor its Advocate General considered any
specific contribution of the socio-economic environment to the limitations,
and as a consequence excluded long-term illness from the notion of disability.
As a consequence, Sonia Chacon Navas could not claim remedies under
discrimination law, but was left with the weaker remedies for unfair dismissal.
The next five cases concerning the notion of disability were decided after
the EU became a signatory to the CRPD.
The Grand Chamber ruling in HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge)84
concerned two secretaries who suffered from illnesses resulting in chronic
back pain and, in order to remain able to continue employment, required
work-related relief in the form of part time work and a height adjustable desk
respectively. Because the employers did not adjust the working environment
in line with the employees’ requests, the employees were frequently absent on
grounds of pain, and accrued sufficient time of sick leave to justify a dismissal
under Danish law in line with their specific contracts of employment. The
employees and the trade unions representing them claimed that their frequent
illnesses and the subsequent dismissal were caused by their disability, and that
the dismissals constituted disability discrimination. The employers insisted
that they suffered from long-term illnesses which, as decided in Chacon
Navas, would not qualify as disability. Accordingly, the Court had the
opportunity to revisit the question how to qualify long term illnesses in
81. Case C-13/05, Chacon Navas.
82. Para 76 of his Opinion (EU:C:2006:184).
83. Para 62 of his Opinion.
84. Case C-335/11, HK Danmark, EU:C:2013:222.
CML Rev. 201654 Schiek
relation to the notion of disability.85 Referring explicitly to the CRPD, the
Court first phrased the definition quoted above,86 a definition that was praised
for recognizing the role of the socio-economic environment in constituting
disability.87
The Grand Chamber did not, however, overrule Chacón Navas. Instead, it
repeated that illness indeed cannot be equated with disability88 and added that
also the ability to work only to a limited extent did not constitute disability.89
Next the Court reaffirmed that a disability presupposes a “limitation which
results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments” if
that “limitation is long term”.90 Between these two phrases, which are
repeated verbatim from the Chacon Navas ruling, the Court added that the
limitations in interaction between impairment and “various barriers may
hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in
professional life on an equal basis with other workers”.91 Thus the Court only
modified the Chacon Navas ruling as far as absolutely necessary to pay
respect to the CRPD. It certainly did not follow the social model of disability:
in its reasoning, societal barriers do not cause the disability. While creating a
hindrance to full and effective participation, they potentially add to the
limitation which continues to be linked to the impairment suffered by the
person so disabled. Nevertheless, the HK Denmark ruling became the main
reference point in the Court’s subsequent case law.
The Z case,92 as far as the notion of disability is concerned,93 evolved
around the question whether the claimant was disabled by the refusal of her
employer to grant maternity leave after having a child through the use of a
surrogate mother. Z had been born without a womb, while displaying all the
chromosomes that classic medicine associates with femininity. As she wanted
to become a biological mother, she and her husband decided to conclude a
commercial agreement on the use of another woman’s womb to carry a child
combined from their genes. Z’s employer offered generous arrangements for
parental leave, but did not provide maternity leave, since Z had not become a
mother. In one limb of her argument, Z relied on disability discrimination law.
85. The HK Danmark ruling also contains important statements on the concept of
reasonable accommodation, which lie beyond the scope of this article.
86. See supra note 38, para 53 of the HK Danmark ruling.
87. See the case notes referenced supra note 4.
88. Case C-335/11, HK Danmark, para 42.
89. Ibid., para 43.
90. Ibid., para 47.
91. Ibid.
92. Case C-363/12, Z.
93. For a detailed case note including deliberations on the gender discrimination aspects see
Finck and Kas, “Surrogacy leave as a matter of EU law: CD and Z”, 52 CML Rev. (2015),
281–198.
Disability 55
The Court again duly referred to the CRPD and stated that disability
referred to a limitation resulting from long-term physical, mental or
psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may
hinder full participation in professional life.94 However, subsequently the
Court focused on the impairment alone, stating that the inability to give birth
due to the lack of a uterus constitutes a condition which at the same time
constitutes a limitation.95 Thus, the focus on the medical condition causing a
limitation. The Court consequently concluded that “the inability to have a
child by conventional means does not in itself … (constitute) a hindrance to
the exercise of her professional activity”.96
In this case, the Court clearly struggled with finding a notion of disability
which reacts to the impairment and the social conditions which turn the
impairment into a disability. On the one hand it focused on the physical status,
on the other hand on the limitations of professional activity, seemingly unable
to combine the two. Thus, the weakness already visible in the HK Danmark
ruling can be observed more openly in this ruling, demonstrating that the
Court was still relying on medicalized notions of disability. This focus on the
physical elements of impairment can be criticized as a move away from a
human rights model of disability to a misunderstanding of disability. As a
result of all these considerations, the Court held that a person displaying all the
markers of femininity except having a womb cannot be considered as disabled
in working life, and thus cannot claim maternity leave after entering into a
commercial contract concerning the pregnancy of another woman on the basis
of reasonable accommodation. We will return to this gendered aspect of the
case below.
The Glatzel case97 seemed to underline the Court’s gradual return to the
medical model of disability. The claimant was a lorry driver, who had lost his
driving licence due to driving under the influence of alcohol. He had to apply
for a new licence, and when he did so the application was refused on a
different basis: according to national legislation implementing EU Directive
2006/126, which excluded persons with certain visual impairments from
driving heavy goods vehicles, he was considered unable to drive heavy goods
transporters safely because of a visual impairment which became apparent
during the examination: a substantial functional loss of vision in one eye (but
which is compensated by full binocular vision).98 The referring court wanted
the Court of Justice to rule that Annex III of the Directive was invalid, because
94. Case C-363/12, Z, para 76.
95. Para 79.
96. Para 81.
97. Case C-356/12,Wolfgang Glatzel.
98. Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 Dec. 2006
on driving licences, O.J. 2006, L 403/18.
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it discriminated on grounds of disability. The Court did not comply with that
request, finding that limiting the professional life of persons with visual
impairments was justified by road safety and public health concerns. While
the Court cited its own reasoning in HK Denmark, indicating openness to the
social model of disability, the Court also analysed the actual visual capacity of
the claimant. The Court found that the claimant had full binocular visual
acuity, and concluded that it did “not have sufficient information to ascertain
whether such an impairment [i.e. weak vision in one eye, which is
compensated by the other eye] constitutes a disability”.99 Accordingly, the
Court tried to derive the disability from the impairment as such, omitting any
reference to the interaction between society and impairment which creates
disability.100
This narrow view contrasted with the Opinion of Advocate General Bot,
who did conceive of Mr Glatzel as disabled by the restrictive legislation
following the EU Directive. Like the Court, the Advocate General observed
that Mr Glatzel had limited visibility caused by a physical impairment.
Advocate General Bot then considered the inflexible definition of full
visibility in Directive 2006/126, and concluded that it was this definition
which resulted in hindering Mr Glatzel in exercising his profession, thus
leaving him disabled. Had the Court followed this argument, it would have
acknowledged a moderate social model of disability.101 However, the Court
was not ready to do so. This is surprising because Advocate General Bot
came to the same conclusion as the Court in its final recommendation: he
opined that Mr Glatzel had been treated differently on grounds of disability,
but that withholding professional options from Mr Glatzel was justified as it
was necessary to uphold public safety. Accordingly, an adequate notion of
disability would not have led to a different result.
Arguably, in the Kaltoft case the Court continued on the path of moving
away from a moderate version of the social model of disability. Again, the
definition of disability developed inHK Denmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge)
as well as the UN Convention were duly quoted.102 However, the Court then
moved on to state that Mr Kaltoft might be a disabled person “if the
obesity … hindered his full and effective participation in professional
life … on account of reduced mobility or the onset, in that person, of medical
conditions preventing him from carrying out his work or causing
99. Case C-356/12,Wolfgang Glatzel, para 47.
100. See O’Brien, “Driving down disability equality? Case C-356/12 Wolfgang Glatzel v
Freistaat Bayern”, 21 MJ (2014), 726.
101. Paras. 34–40 of the Opinion in Case C-365/12,Wolfgang Glatzel, EU:C:2013:505.
102. Paras. 53 and 64 of the judgment in Case C-354/13, FAOKaltoft; for the definition see
supra text at note 38.
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discomfort when carrying out his professional activity”.103 Similarly,
Advocate General Jääskinnen engaged in physical assessment of obese
persons, coming to the conclusion that only obesity class III, requiring a BMI
of 40 or higher, can ever lead to disability.104 Thus, he qualified the degree of
deviance from a normal weight as a threshold to accept disability. In the social
model of disability, the refusal of an employer to take on a person on grounds
of a certain weight might well constitute the barrier which converts the
specific weight of that person’s body into a disability. As Advocate General
Jääskinnen correctly noted, prejudicial actions such as this could also
constitute discrimination.105 The adequate remedy would not be providing
“reasonable accommodation”, but rather demanding that employers refrain
from stigmatization.
Analysing all these rulings, we can observe a Court hesitant to embrace the
social model of disability or the CRPDs human rights model. Instead it
returned to a definition relying on physical elements of a disability concept,
which had seemed no longer relevant after the CRPD. Neither did the Court
consider finding a definition of disability inspired by the purposes of EU
discrimination law, i.e. to prevent discriminatory exclusion on the basis of
ascribed otherness. As mentioned, this would suggest defining disability for
the purposes of discrimination law without reference to degrees of disability,
categories of obesity or levels of pain. All these metric/medical approaches
ultimately demand that the disabled person needs to establish their own
disability before being able to claim protection.
For the purposes of discrimination law it is completely sufficient that
exclusion results from the ascription of disability.Thus, it is unequal treatment
based on the assumption that a certain appearance or feature constitutes a
barrier to full participation which constitutes disability.
For example, if an employer believes that an obese person needs to lose
weight in order to fulfil their tasks, this belief will constitute a disability for
obese persons dealing with this employer, irrespective of the truth of that
belief. Similarly, if an employer believes that a facially disfigured salesperson
will not achieve sufficient profits, this belief will also constitute a disability
for persons with facial disfigurements. As long as courts have to deal with
mere stereotypes, any definition of thresholds of impairment is wholly
dysfunctional. For the Kaltoft case, this would imply that an employer who
urges a childminder to lose weight with a weight loss plan is obviously
convinced that weight impacts on performance. This would be sufficient to
consider the obesity as disability in dealing with this employer. The Court
103. Case C-354/13, FAO Kaltoft, para 60.
104. Para 60 of the Opinion in Case C-354/13, FAO Kaltoft.
105. Ibid., para 39.
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could have gone towards a definition of disability adequate for discrimination
law and assumed that the employer’s concern with her employee’s weight
indicates that being overweight constituted a disability in this environment.
Similarly, in the Glatzel case, any metric proof by the claimant would have
been unhelpful. The Court should have held that the threshold established in
Directive 2006/126 transformed certain visual impairments into disabilities
for heavy goods drivers. This would not have answered the question whether
this exclusion is justified in the interest of safety and health protection.
Similarly, stereotypes excluding those affected by non-manifest illnesses
(such as HIV infection or so-called “dry alcoholism”) transform those
conditions into disabilities, although they do not constitute impairments.
Defining disability without recourse to metrics or medicalization is more
difficult if those affected by impairments really have different abilities than
others. In cases such as HK Denmark, where an impairment such as chronic
back pain actually reduces the ability to work for more than a few hours a day
or other than in a certain bodily position, disability seems to result from the
imposition of employment standards that do not respect that difference. Still,
any metric approach would not have helped deciding these cases. Instead, a
substantive assessment of the employers’ reluctance to accommodate would
allow the assessment of whether chronic back pain is a disability under these
circumstances. If an employer as soon as the employee is dismissed introduces
the variable height desk the employee had required, there is every indication
that the dismissal may be discriminatory instead of rational, and would not
result from the impairment, but rather the social environment’s (lack of)
reaction to it.
5.2. A Court insensitive to intersectional inequalities? Gendered aspects
of defining disability
In its first six rulings on the notion of disability, the Court also had to address
the second challenge in defining disability – avoiding the intersectionality
trap.106 While disability may also intersect with race and ethnicity, in these
cases gendered aspects were more relevant, and thus the intersection of gender
and disability will be the focus of these deliberations.
The employment realities as well as the illnesses at stake in HK Denmark
(Ring and Skoboe Werge) are typical for women: the majority of secretaries
are female,107 and conditions leading to chronic pain in the back are typically
106. See supra 4.2.
107. On gender segregation in occupation in Europe see European Commission’s Expert
Group on Gender and Employment, Gender Segregation in the Labour Market (European
Commission, 2009) and Burchell, Hardy, Rubery and Smith, A New Method to Understand
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triggered by activities involving spatial confinement, which is frequently
typical for those office posts offered to women.108 Also, chronic pain and
associated reduced capacity to perform are typical for impairments disabling
women.109 Accordingly, the Court’s reluctant approach towards
acknowledging long-term conditions as impairment giving rise to disability
ensures that conditions more frequently occurring in women are less prone to
bring their bearers within the fold of discrimination law. Such gender
discrimination in defining disability should be avoided.
The gender dimension is even more pronounced in the Z case, relating to the
inability to bear children, due to a physical condition, of a person categorized
as a woman. Society continues to expect all women to bear children.
Consequently, infertility is experienced as more stigmatizing by women than
by men.110 Infertility has been defined as illness as recently as 2009,111 and
this is perceived as an aspect of the medicalization of women’s lives in highly
industrialized societies.112 Moreover, while women are generally stigmatized
if they do not bear children for whatever reason, disabled women are
frequently subjected to forced abortion and sterilization, thus depriving them
of the choice to bear children. Thus, the Z case necessitated a gendered
perspective on disability in particular. However, this perspective would not
have called for accepting that not being able to bear children is a disadvantage
in employment. On the contrary, men’s inability to bear children is routinely
held up as the reason for women’s weaker employment market position.
Accordingly, in the field of employment the lack of a womb will not be the
starting point for disability. Insofar, the ruling in Z would not have had to
change under this perspective.
While Mr Kaltoft is not a woman, that case still involved a field of
occupation where female workers outnumber male workers: care work is still
gendered female.113 Also, more women are obese than men.114 A number of
Occupational Gender Segregation in European Labour Markets (European Commission,
2014), with specific statistics detailing the percentage of women among “office clerks” at over
70% at p. 51.
108. Burchell et al., op. cit. supra note 109, 84–85 with figure 53.
109. See supra notes 68 and 69.
110. On the gendered nature of the infertility stigma, see Fenton, Rees and Heenan, “‘Shall
I be a mother?’Reproductive autonomy, feminism and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
act 2008”, in Jones et al. (Eds.), Gender, Sexualities and the Law (Routledge, 2011).
111. Ireni-Saban, “Give me children or else I die: The politics and policy of cross border
reproductive care”, 41 Politics and Policy (2013), 5–38.
112. Greil, McQullan and Slauson-Blevins, “The social construction of infertility”, 5
Sociology Compass (2011), 738–746.
113. On occupational segregation by gender in Europe see European Commission’s Expert
Group on gender and employment, Gender Segregation in the Labour Market (European
Commission, 2009), with a specific case study on professional child care at pp. 81–85; on
CML Rev. 201660 Schiek
studies found that obesity has more negative effects on the employment
opportunities and wage levels of women than of men.115 More particularly, for
women, even mere overweight impacts negatively on employment
opportunities.116 The negative impact of overweight and obesity is
particularly pronounced for black women.117 Thus the question whether a
child minder can be dismissed because of obesity in the 3rd degree is of more
practical relevance to women than to men, and may frequently create
situations of inequality at the intersections between gender and disability. In
this context it is particularly worthy of note that according to Advocate
General Jääskinnen, only morbid obesity should be considered as a disability.
Next to not being in line with the social model of disability, this reasoning is
also likely to deprive more women than men of the protection of disability
discrimination law.
So far, none of the cases that found their way to the Court of Justice has
established ethnic or racial dimensions of disability. However, such
dimensions undoubtedly exist. The more negative impact of obesity on
employment opportunities of women of colour has already been mentioned as
an example. While not debated before the Court of Justice yet, the
stigmatization of Roma children as mentally disabled in order to achieve
ethnically segregated schools has been brought before the European Court of
Human Rights.118
6. Conclusion
Developing the notion of disability for the purposes of EU discrimination law,
the Court has certainly made progress from its first ruling in 2006 to its sixth
gender segregation in professional childcare see also Peeters, “Including men in early
childhood education: Insights from the European experience”, 10 NZ Research in Early
Childhood Education (2007), 1–13.
114. The main measurement for obesity is the Body Mass Index, calculated as a function of
height and weight, which classes a woman as obese if her BMI is above 30. According to
WHO statistics, in 2008 10% of men and 14% of women were obese. In Europe, the sex
difference was less pronounced: 22% of women and 20% of men were obese. <www.who.int/
gho/ncd/risk_factors/obesity_text/en>.
115. Boeri, Patacchini and Peri, Unexplored Dimensions of Discrimination (OUP, 2015),
pp. 158–165; Shinall, Why Obese Workers Earn Less: Occupational Sorting and Its
Implications for the Legal System, Vanderbilt Law School Working Paper (2014), <papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379575>.
116. Fikkan and Rothblum, “Is fat a feminist issue? Exploring the gendered nature of
weight bias”, (2011) Feminist Forum (DOI 10.1007/s11199-011-0022-5).
117. Fikkan and Rothblum, ibid. Solanke, “A legal remedy for corpulent women of
colour”, in Schiek and Lawson (Ed.), op. cit. supra note 5, with further references.
118. ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Appl. No. 57325/00,DH and Others v. the Czech Republic,
13 Nov. 2007.
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one in 2014. However, as so frequently in EU law, progress has been halting
and fitful. There is still some ground to cover for the Court to arrive at an
acceptable and workable definition of disability for the purposes of
discrimination law.
This article has argued that a steady move from a medical to a social model
of disability is not the solution for defining disability for the purposes of
discrimination law. Instead it has argued that a definition of all discrimination
grounds, including disability, can be derived from the purposes of
discrimination law: protecting against the harm of exclusion on the grounds
of ascribed otherness, and protecting individuation as well as respecting
difference. The fact that there is a common rationale of discrimination law for
the three interconnected nodes sex/gender, race/ethnicity and disability also
suggests that discrimination grounds should be defined in such a way that they
are not mutually exclusive, but rather reinforce each other.
It has been shown that for disability discrimination, this approach mitigates
against a metric approach to disability, which would derive the definition of
disability from a certain level of impairment.
Beyond that, a workable purposive definition of disability will be easy to
find where false stereotyping results in excluding persons perceived as
disabled from participation in employment or other activities. Such exclusion
may be based on an employer’s reference, as in the HK Danmark case, or on
legislation, as in the Glatzel case. In cases where impairment restricts the
radius of activities with acute relevance to the desired form of participation,
disability is established when access to or progression in employment for
those persons is hindered through a lack of flexibility to adapt. The
impairment clearly constitutes a starting point for acknowledging disability in
these cases.
It has further been demonstrated that neither the social model of disability
nor the Court’s case law avoids the intersectionality trap. Instead, the
definition of disability tends to move impairments suffered disproportionally
by women beyond the reach of disability discrimination law. Especially in
cases of chronic illnesses involving pain, recognizing the impairment through
suffering while defining disability is important from the perspective of
intersecting nodes of discrimination grounds: defining disability in such a
way that impairments typically suffered by women are not typically
recognized as protected under disability discrimination law constitutes gender
discrimination. This has also shown that intersectionality theory plays an
important role in defining individual discrimination grounds.
All this results in a clearly defined, but nevertheless wide notion of
disability. In all six cases discussed above, the Court should have stated that
the claimants had been disabled, with the exception of the Z case. The wide
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notion of disability is balanced by the exceptions allowing unequal treatment
on grounds of disability, including the bona fide occupational requirement
(Art. 2 Directive 2000/78), as well as limitations on the obligation to provide
reasonable accommodation.
These limitations also show the limits of disability discrimination law,
which clearly is unable to bring about the desired participation of disabled
persons in all areas of life. In line with the human rights approach to disability
promoted by the CRPD a range of rights and policies are required to ensure
that disabled people are included and able to fully participate in society on
equal terms.119 Its limited reach is due to the specific mission of
discrimination law as a whole, which is best achieved if the focus of
discrimination law is not lost.
119. Degener, op. cit. supra note 12, No. 5.
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